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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
  
  early seventy years have passed since the Nuremberg trials, the last time 
the crime of aggression was the object of prosecution. The adoption of the 
Kampala Amendments to the Rome Statute (Kampala Amendments)1 has 
been welcomed as an historic breakthrough, which may provide a landmark 
step forward for the prosecution of this crime.2 Furthermore, the activation 
of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on the crime of 
aggression has raised the hope that the prosecution of this long-overlooked 
crime could again become a reality. 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, and in parallel to discussions 
on the crime of aggression, the maintenance of peace was at the center of 
international legal debate. Accordingly, the Charter of the United Nations 
provides for the maintenance of international peace and security as the pur-
pose of the United Nations. The decolonization era that followed the found-
ing of the organization, and the consequent emergence of new members of 
the international community, nurtured discussions on the notion of peace 
and its significance to international law. Nevertheless, and similar to the 
crime of aggression, over the past decades the concept of peace within in-
ternational has been pushed to the periphery of legal debate. 
Since 1945, the international legal framework has changed dramatically. 
Notably, as human rights have gained importance, they have reshaped the 
legal landscape, a phenomenon referred to as the humanization of interna-
tional law.3 Peace and aggression have not remained immune from this per-
vading humanitarian sensitivity and this article investigates the effects of the 
humanization of international law on these key concepts. Specifically, it ar-
gues that a new trend is emerging, whereby human rights, more than the 
maintenance of peace per se, is increasingly seen as the foundational aim of 
the international legal framework. In turn, this article questions whether this 
is a welcomed development and highlights the risks of this approach. 
                                                                                                                      
1. International Criminal Court, The Crime of Aggression, Resolution RC/Res.6, An-
nex I, art. 8bis, ICC Doc. RC/11 (June 11, 2010) [hereinafter Kampala Amendments]. 
2. Niels Blokker & Claus Kress, A Consensus Agreement on the Crime of Aggression: Impres-
sions from Kampala, 23 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 889 (2010). 
3. See especially THEODOR MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2006). 
 
 
 
The Human Dimension of Peace and Aggression Vol. 96 
605 
 
 
 
 
 
To do so, this article focuses on the humanization of the crime of ag-
gression. Aggression, as it is traditionally understood, is “the supreme inter-
national crime,”4 and the prohibition on this crime aims to protect the sov-
ereignty and the territorial integrity of States. Following World War II, the 
more recent humanization of international criminal law (ICL) has brought 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity to the fore of the inter-
national legal system. As the attention has shifted to the protection of human 
beings, the logical consequence was to focus on criminalizing acts that cause 
human suffering. Therefore, inasmuch as the aim of the criminalization of 
aggression is to protect State sovereignty, the crime of aggression has grad-
ually lost its central role and has lived in a legal limbo. 
Nevertheless, the crime of aggression did not evade the humanitarian 
sensitivity that has pervaded ICL. Notably, practice and scholarship alike 
have attempted to reframe the crime of aggression in terms of human rights.5 
On the one hand, it has been suggested that the reason why aggression 
should be criminalized is because of its consequences on individuals. Indeed, 
aggression is an unlawful use of force that causes human suffering and that 
is unjustified and could have been avoided. On the other hand, during the 
Kampala Conference a number of delegates propounded that genuine hu-
manitarian intervention should not fall within the scope of application of the 
crime of aggression. This position, shared by several scholars, would suggest 
that the protection of other international crimes should be prioritized and 
would justify the commission of acts that could potentially amount to ag-
gression. This raises the question of whether the crime of aggression is still 
the supreme international crime. 
Part II examines the process of the humanization of peace. In the after-
math of World War II, peace was generally considered as the absence of 
international armed conflicts (negative peace). However, as international law 
has been humanized, so has the idea of peace. Critics of the concept of neg-
ative peace highlighted that the mere absence of war does not reflect the 
                                                                                                                      
4. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL 427 (1948) [hereinafter IMT Judgment]; see also Donald M. Ferencz, Continued 
Debate Over the Crime of Aggression: A Supreme International Irony, 58 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL 
LAW JOURNAL 24 (2017). 
5. See, e.g., Tom Dannenbaum, Why Have We Criminalized Aggressive War?, 126 YALE LAW 
JOURNAL 1242, 1278 (2017); Frédéric Mégret, What is the Specific Evil of Aggression? A Three 
Way Typology, in THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION: A COMMENTARY 1398, 1402 (Claus Kreß & 
Stefan Barriga eds., 2017). 
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complexities of the current legal framework, nor the values it seeks to pro-
tect: a just society that respects human rights. Therefore, positive peace 
emerged as a concept that “implies a social and political ordering of society 
that is generally accepted as just.”6 At the same time, the existence of a right 
to peace has been proclaimed at the international and regional levels. 
Parts III and IV analyze the consequences of the parallel humanization 
of peace and aggression. This process brings to the fore the complex rela-
tionship between peace, justice, and human rights, a relationship that has 
informed the legal discourse on the jus ad bellum in general and on aggression 
in particular. Inasmuch as the primary purpose of the United Nations is the 
maintenance of international peace and security, as established by Article 1 
of the U.N. Charter, it seems clear that the U.N. system prioritizes the ab-
sence of war over justice. Nevertheless, the mere absence of war does not 
seem to be accepted as the ultimate value and objective of the international 
community because this absence does not guarantee justice. Indeed, schol-
arship and practice alike have tried to push for the introduction of exceptions 
to the ban on the use of force that are considered just and legitimate, albeit 
unlawful.7 The most emblematic examples concern humanitarian interven-
tion and the responsibility to protect. However, we could also think of inter-
ventions to promote democracy and the provision of weapons and other 
support to armed groups that are fighting against regimes deemed illegiti-
mate. Accordingly, we may wonder whether the humanization of peace and 
aggression has caused a shift of paradigm, whereby human rights have 
emerged as a parameter of justice and as the primary aim of the current legal 
framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
6. MICHAEL HOWARD, THE INVENTION OF PEACE AND THE REINVENTION OF WAR 
2 (2002). 
7. Fernando R. Teson, Kosovo: A Powerful Precedent for the Doctrine of Humanitarian Interven-
tion, 1 AMSTERDAM LAW FORUM 42 (2008); Tania Voon, Closing the Gap between Legitimacy and 
Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from East Timor and Kosovo, 7 UCLA JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & FOREIGN AFFAIRS 31 (2002).  
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II.  THE HUMANIZATION OF AGGRESSION 
 
A. Aggression as the “Supreme International Crime” 
 
Efforts to control and limit war have been attempted for centuries.8 Never-
theless, it was only in the aftermath of World War I that States engaged in 
multilateral endeavors to ban war. Institutionally, the League of Nations was 
created “to promote international co-operation and to achieve international 
peace and security”9 through collective mechanisms. Nevertheless, its Cov-
enant (1920) did not outlaw war per se, but simply distinguished between 
lawful and unlawful wars.10 The Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) went further and 
banned war with no exceptions.11 Although these efforts constituted valua-
ble attempts to prevent war, at the time legal scholars and practitioners were 
aware that, “unless coupled with meaningful sanctions, the interdiction of 
aggressive war was liable to be chimerical.”12 Notably, it was recognized that 
                                                                                                                      
8. The Islamic, Hindu, Egyptian, and Assyrian-Babylonian civilizations developed 
norms addressing the legitimacy of war. In the first century BCE, Cicero set forth the basis 
to distinguish between just and unjust war. In the Middle Ages, theologians such as Augus-
tine, Thomas Aquinas, and Isidore of Seville elaborated sophisticated rules to determine 
when war is just, and thus legitimate. In more recent times, States have concluded a number 
of treaties aimed at prohibiting or at least limiting war, such as the Bryan treaties and the 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 on the pacific settlement of international disputes. 
See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, THE CRIME AGAINST PEACE AND 
AGGRESSION: FROM ITS ORIGINS TO THE ICC 208 (2008); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AG-
GRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 80 (5th ed. 2011); Kurt A. Raaflaub, Introduction: Searching for 
Peace in the Ancient World, in SEARCHING FOR PEACE IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 1 (Kurt A. 
Raaflaub ed., 2007); Gregory A. Raymond, The Greco-Roman Roots of the Western Just War Tra-
dition, in THE PRISM OF JUST WAR: ASIAN AND WESTERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE LEGITI-
MATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE 7, 17 (Howard M. Hensel ed., 2010). 
9. Covenant of the League of Nations pmbl. 
10. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY THE STATES 57 
(1963); see also Edwin Borchard, War, Neutrality and Non-Belligerency, 35 AMERICAN JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 618 (1941); James L. Brierly, International Law and Resort to Armed 
Force, 4 CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL 308, 310 (1932); KIRSTEN SELLARS, “CRIMES AGAINST 
PEACE” AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (2013). 
11. In the treaty, the parties “condemn[ed] recourse to war for the solution of interna-
tional controversies, and renounce[d] it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations 
with one another” and agreed “that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of 
whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall 
never be sought except by pacific means.” General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an 
Instrument of National Policy arts. 1–2, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 [here-
inafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]. 
12. DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 125. 
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State responsibility for waging an unlawful war was not enough and that in-
dividual criminal responsibility would have been crucial in this regard.13 
The endeavor to prosecute the German Kaiser should be read against 
this backdrop.14 Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles expressly established 
that: “[t]he Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Ho-
henzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against inter-
national morality and the sanctity of treaties.”15 The Kaiser found refuge in 
the Netherlands, which was not a party to the Treaty, thus the trial never 
took place.16 While Article 227 does not have any reference to aggression or 
crimes against peace, as at the time they did not amount to a violation of 
international law,17 this provision could be considered the antecedent of at-
tempts to criminalize aggressive war.18 
Following the dramatic experience of World War II, efforts to outlaw 
war and criminalize aggression gained momentum.19 In June 1945, represent-
atives of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Un-
ion gathered in London to attend the Inter-Allied Conference on the Pun-
ishment of War Crimes. Their work led to the adoption of the London 
Agreement and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal.20 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, the U.S. representative at 
the conference, was one of the major supporters of the idea of prosecuting 
                                                                                                                      
13. William A. Schabas, Origins of the Criminalization of Aggression: How Crimes against Peace 
Became the “Supreme International Crime”, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE 
CRIME OF AGGRESSION 17, 20 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004). 
14. SELLARS, supra note 10, at 1; see also WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE TRIAL OF THE KAI-
SER (2018). 
15. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany art. 227, 
June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 188. 
16. Andreas L. Paulus, Peace through Justice – The Future of the Crime of Aggression in a Time 
of Crisis, 50 WAYNE LAW REVIEW 1, 9 (2004). 
17. Schabas, supra note 13, at 29. 
18. See, e.g., Geneva Protocol on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes pmbl. 
(Oct. 2, 1924), reprinted in 19 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 
9 (1925) (stating “a war of aggression constitutes . . . an international crime”). Nevertheless, 
the Protocol did not enter into force. See BASSIOUNI & FERENCZ, supra note 8, at 210; DIN-
STEIN, supra note 8, at 125. 
19. Paulus, supra note 16, at 7 (“The history of the crime of aggression is closely asso-
ciated with the efforts to cope with the experiences of two World Wars in the 20th cen-
tury.”). 
20. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter IMT Charter]; see also Schabas, supra note 13, at 27. 
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the defendants for the crime of aggression.21 Coincidentally, he formally pre-
sented his proposal to include aggressive war in the crimes prosecuted by the 
Tribunal on June 26, 1945, the same day as the San Francisco Conference 
banned the use of force in the U.N. Charter.22 As Jackson wrote, “it is high 
time that we act on the judicial principle that aggressive war-making is illegal 
and criminal.”23 While the French delegate André Gros stated that France 
did not consider aggressive war as a crime, thus suggesting that its inclusion 
in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal would violate the nullum 
crimen, nulla poena sine lege principle, the British and Soviet representatives 
manifested enthusiasm for the proposal. Accordingly, on August 8, 1945, 
crimes against peace were introduced in the Charter. Soon thereafter, they 
appeared in Article II(1)(a) of Control Council Law No. 10 and in Article 
5(a) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 
albeit with minor changes.24 
The inclusion of the crime of aggression in the statutes of the tribunals 
was criticized on two grounds. First, it is highly debatable whether waging 
aggressive war was a crime before the adoption of the London Agreement. 
Indeed, while the Tribunal relied heavily on the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the 
latter does not criminalize aggression.25 Further, the content of the crime of 
                                                                                                                      
21. Henry T. King Jr., Nuremberg and Crimes Against Peace, 41 CASE WESTERN RESERVE 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 273, 274–75 (2009). 
22. Benjamin B. Ferencz, Defining Aggression: Where It Stands and Where It’s Going, 66 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 491, 492 (1972). 
23. REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE IN-
TERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS 52 (1949) [hereinafter JACKSON RE-
PORT]; see also BASSIOUNI & FERENCZ, supra note 8, at 213.  
24. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The “Nuremberg Legacy,” in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
195 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999); David Luban, The Legacies of Nuremberg, 54 SOCIAL RE-
SEARCH 779 (1987). 
25. DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 127. It is beyond the scope of this article to exhaustively 
address the debate on the nullum crimen sine lege principle with regard to the crime of aggres-
sion. This question was discussed briefly by the IMT. See IMT Judgment, supra note 4, at 39. 
For an in-depth analysis of the issue, see, for example, NEIL BOISTER & ROBERT CRYER, 
THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: A REAPPRAISAL (2008); George A. 
Finch, The Nuremberg Trial and International Law, 41 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 20 (1947); Michael J Glennon, The Blank-Prose Crime of Aggression, 35 YALE 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 71 (2010); Oscar Solera, The Definition of the Crime of 
Aggression: Lessons Not Learned, 42 CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 801 (2010); Quincy Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (1947). 
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aggression was not clear and no criteria were provided to guide the inter-
preter.26 Therefore, Garcia-Mora concluded that: “the most conspicuous 
facts about crimes against peace are both their vague and general description, 
and the utter lack of agreement regarding their criminality under interna-
tional law.”27 
While is seems clear that aggression was not a crime under customary 
international law when the London Charter was concluded,28 it nonetheless 
played a paramount role during the Nuremberg trials. Indeed, during his 
opening address Jackson affirmed that: “[t]his inquest represents the practi-
cal effort of four of the most mighty of nations, with the support of 17 more, 
to utilize international law to meet the greatest menace of our times—ag-
gressive war.”29 Furthermore, he expressed the idea that aggression is “the 
crime which comprehends all lesser crimes.”30 The judgment adopted at Nu-
remberg reflects this view. Notably, it specifies that: “[t]o initiate a war of 
aggression . . . is not only an international crime; it is the supreme interna-
tional crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within 
itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”31 The implications of this approach 
were clearly expressed by Schick in 1947, who stated: “everything else in the 
Nuremberg trial, however dramatic, however sordid, however shocking and 
revolting to the feelings of civilized peoples, is only incidental, or subordinate 
to the supreme crime against peace.”32 
According to the traditional view, aggression is “a crime by one state 
against another that consists of a violent attack on the latter’s sovereignty.”33 
                                                                                                                      
26. Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, Crimes Against Peace, 34 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 1, 3 
(1965). 
27. Id. at 9. 
28. Leo Gross, The Criminality of Aggressive War, 41 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE RE-
VIEW 205, 218–20 (1947). 
29. 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL 99 (1947) [hereinafter JACKSON OPENING ADDRESS]. 
30. JACKSON REPORT, supra note 23, at 51. 
31. IMT Judgment, supra note 4, at 427. 
32. Franz B. Schick, Crimes Against Peace, 38 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMI-
NOLOGY 445, 447 (1948); see also ROBERT CRYER, HÅKAN FRIMAN & DARRYL ROBINSON, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 114 (2010) 
(noting that “the prosecution, in particular the U.S. section, saw the trial as being primarily 
one of aggression, rather than of the Holocaust”); DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 128 (“It is 
virtually irrefutable that present-day positive international law reflects the [Nuremberg] 
Judgment. War of aggression currently constitutes a crime against peace. Not just a crime, 
but the supreme crime under international law.”). 
33. Mégret, supra note 5, at 1402. 
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Indeed, the judgments adopted at Nuremberg and by the International Mil-
itary Tribunal for the Far East stress that crimes against peace consist of 
waging aggressive wars against other countries. In the same vein, Control 
Council Law No. 10 focuses on “initiation of invasions of other countries.”34 
The centrality of sovereignty to the legality of the use of force is evident also 
in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which emphasizes “the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any State.”35 This position has been reiterated 
and confirmed in key international instruments that followed the Charter. 
For instance, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution on 
the Definition of Aggression states, “Aggression is the use of armed force 
by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independ-
ence of another State.”36 Likewise, the Kampala Amendments define aggres-
sion as “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State.”37 
The understanding of aggression as a crime whose prohibition is directed 
at protecting State interests is vastly accepted in the legal scholarship. For 
instance, Kahn finds that the criminalization of aggression at the Nuremberg 
trials led to the emergence of “a new legal regime founded on protecting 
state sovereignty through the prohibition on the use of force.”38 Similarly, 
Stahn contends that the crime of aggression “extends criminalization from 
its current focus on gross human rights violations and victims’ rights to in-
terstate relations, the protection of state interests (‘sovereignty’, ‘territorial 
integrity’, ‘political independence’), and the preservation of peace – that is, 
the absence of the unlawful use of armed force.”39 This characteristic is 
unique to aggression and distinguishes it from other international crimes. In 
its traditional understanding, aggression is ultimately a crime that violates the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. Therefore, its focus is on State 
                                                                                                                      
34. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, 
T.I.A.S. No. 1589 [hereinafter IMTFE Charter]; Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment 
of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity (Dec. 20, 
1945), 3 OFFICIAL GAZETTE, CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY 50 (1946). 
35. U.N. Charter art. 2, para 4. 
36. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Definition of Aggression art. 1 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
37. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8bis, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see also Kampala Amendments, supra note 1. 
38. PAUL W. KAHN, SACRED VIOLENCE: TORTURE, TERROR, AND SOVEREIGNTY 55 
(2008). 
39. Carsten Stahn, The “End”, the “Beginning of the End” or the “End of the Beginning”? Intro-
ducing Debates and Voices on the Definition of “Aggression,” 23 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, 875, 877 (2010). 
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interests per se, irrespective of the consequences of the unlawful use of force 
on the population. As we shall see, this view came to be criticized in light of 
the humanization of international law.40 
 
B. The Humanization of International Criminal Law 
 
Following the end of World War II, human rights have emerged as the cor-
nerstone of the U.N. system. Not only is “promoting and encouraging re-
spect for human rights” one of the stated purposes of the United Nations,41 
but several human rights treaties have been adopted this approach at the 
international and regional level.42 As human rights have gained importance, 
international law has “shifted away from a regime rooted exclusively in state 
sovereignty and toward a regime that privileges human rights and human 
values.”43 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) acknowledged this evolution in a well-known passage: “[A] State-
sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually supplanted by a human-
being-oriented approach. Gradually the maxim of Roman law hominum causa 
omne jus constitutum est (all law is created for the benefit of human beings) has 
gained a firm foothold in the international community as well.”44 
                                                                                                                      
40. Mégret, supra note 5, at 1403. 
41. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 3, para 1. 
42. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Convention Against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 
1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Mem-
bers of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Rights of Per-
sons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3. At the regional level, see, for exam-
ple, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123; African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 26, 1981, 21 INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 59 (1982); Arab Charter of Human Rights, May 22, 2004, re-
printed in 12 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTER 893 (2005). 
43. Dannenbaum, supra note 5, at 1278. 
44. Prosecutor v. Tadic; Case No. IT-94-1-l, Decision on Defence Motion for Inter-
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 97 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 
1995); see also ROBERT SCHUTTE, CIVILIAN PROTECTION IN ARMED CONFLICTS: EVOLU-
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The effects of the humanization of international law are particularly vis-
ible with regard to international humanitarian law (IHL) and the jus ad bellum. 
On the one hand, the Geneva Conventions shifted the focus from the con-
duct of hostilities—the object of the Hague Conventions—to the protection 
of the victims of war.45 The use of the term “international humanitarian law,” 
as opposed to “the law of armed conflict” or “the law of war,” is emblematic 
of this shift.46 On the other hand, in the 1990s the genocides that took place 
in Rwanda and the Balkans triggered a debate on the duties of States toward 
their own people and on the responsibility of the international community 
when States forfeit their duties. Accordingly, the doctrines of humanitarian 
intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) emerged as attempts to 
answer to these dilemmas. 
Against this backdrop, ICL has gradually shifted its focus toward crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and genocide, that is, crimes committed 
against individuals.47 What happened to the crime of aggression? In his fa-
mous statement, Jackson affirmed that: 
 
The ultimate step in avoiding periodic wars, which are inevitable in a sys-
tem of international lawlessness, is to make statesmen responsible to law. 
And let me make clear that while this is first applied against German ag-
gressors, the law includes, and if it is to serve a useful purpose it must con-
demn, aggression by other nations, including those which sit here now in 
judgment.48 
                                                                                                                      
TION, CHALLENGES AND IMPLEMENTATION 135 (2015); BARBARA VON TIGERSTROM, HU-
MAN SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS 67 (2007); EVAN 
J. CRIDDLE & EVAN FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY: HOW INTERNATIONAL 
LAW CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY 207 (2016). 
45. See Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention 
(II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention (III) Rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; 
Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; see also LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 2 (1996); 
MERON, supra note 3; Yoram Dinstein, The Interaction of International Law and Justice, 16 ISRAEL 
YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 9, 41–42 (1986). 
46. MERON, supra note 3, at 1 (stating that “[a]lthough initially, in the 1950s, interna-
tional humanitarian law or IHL referred only to the Geneva Convention on the protection 
of war victims, it is now increasingly employed to refer to the entire law of armed conflict”). 
47. Dannenbaum, supra note 5, at 1280; ELIAV LIEBLICH, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
CIVIL WARS: INTERVENTION AND CONSENT 175 (2013). 
48. JACKSON OPENING ADDRESS, supra note 29, at 154. 
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However, as the humanization of ICL has brought to the fore genocide, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity, the crime of aggression has gradu-
ally lost its central role in ICL and has lived in a legal limbo.49 Indeed, the 
statutes of the ad hoc tribunals in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda did 
not mention it among the offenses that could be prosecuted.50 Moreover, 
while Article 5(1) of the Rome Statute includes aggression in the jurisdiction 
of the ICC, 51 Article 5(2) adds: 
 
The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a 
provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the 
crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise 
jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent 
with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.52  
 
This provision is the result of a compromise between those in favor of the 
inclusion of the crime of aggression within the jurisdiction of the ICC and 
those who argued against it, because “it is a crime of States more than a crime 
of individuals.”53 Finally, while convening in Uganda on June 11, 2010, the 
First Review Conference on the Rome Statute reached an agreement on the 
                                                                                                                      
49. ILIAS BANTEKAS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 287 (2010) (“There can be no 
contention . . . that the crime of aggression had gradually disappeared from international 
law simply because it had not been incorporated in a subsequent multilateral treaty following 
its birth in the aftermath of WW II.”); SELLARS, supra note 10, at 262 (noting that “the ad 
hoc charge of crimes against peace as a component of the ‘Nürenberg Principles’ quietly 
expired in the bosom of the United Nations”). 
50. DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 129–31; Claus Kreß & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The 
Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression, 8 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE 1179, 1182 (2010); Mégret, supra note 5, at 1399; WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, UNIMAGINA-
BLE ATROCITIES: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS AT THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 200 
(2012). 
51. See Rome Statute, supra note 37, art. 5(1)(d); see also 1 UNITED NATIONS DIPLO-
MATIC CONFERENCE OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT annex I, at 72–73 (2002) 
The Commission shall prepare proposals for a provision on aggression, including the defi-
nition and Elements of Crimes of aggression and the conditions under which the Interna-
tional Criminal Court shall exercise its jurisdiction with regard to this crime. The Commis-
sion shall submit such proposals to the Assembly of States Parties at a Review Conference, 
with a view to arriving at an acceptable provision on the crime of aggression for inclusion 
in this Statute. The provisions relating to the crime of aggression shall enter into force for 
the State Parties in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Statute. 
52. Rome Statute, supra note 37, art. 5(2). 
53. MERON, supra note 3, at 154. 
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crime of aggression. This “remarkable breakthrough”54 led to the adoption 
of Article 8bis of the Rome Statute. On July 17, 2018, with over thirty ratifi-
cations of the Kampala Amendments on the Crime of Aggression, the acti-
vation of the jurisdiction of the ICC over this crime became reality.55 Nev-
ertheless, the adoption of Article 8bis seems to raise more questions than it 
answers. Notably, the amendments adopted at Kampala suggest tension be-
tween the traditional, sovereignty-focused understanding of intervention and 
a human rights sensitivity that has influenced the development of the inter-
national legal framework generally, and of ICL specifically. 
 
C. Reconciling Aggression with Humanized International Criminal Law 
 
The traditional understanding of the crime of aggression, the prohibition of 
which is aimed at protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, 
inevitably find tension with humanized ICL,56 which could explain why the 
crime of aggression has been confined to a legal limbo for decades. This 
development might lead one to wonder whether this crime still makes sense, 
or whether it should simply be abandoned. Indeed, it has been noted that 
there are compelling reasons as to why the crime of aggression should not 
have been added to the Rome Statute. Bassiouni, for example, affirmed that: 
 
[A]ggression has been a crime in the minds of many for such a long time 
that they have come to take it for granted, as if it were a legal reality. Un-
fortunately it was not, and there does not seem to be much of a reason to 
continue that illusion.57  
 
In his view, not only have international armed conflicts become rare com-
pared to non-international ones, but the “classical form of aggression” wit-
nessed during the two World Wars is unlikely to play a crucial role in the 
future. Indeed, cyber technology and autonomous weapons have dramati-
cally changed the way States engage in military operations and armed con-
flict. The development of new means to wage war and the central role played 
by non-State actors in the international arena pose unprecedented challenges 
                                                                                                                      
54. Kreß & von Holtzendorff, supra note 50, at 1180. 
55. Tom Ruys, Criminalizing Aggression: How the Future of the Law on the Use of Force Rests 
in the Hands of the ICC, 29 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 887, 888 (2018). 
56. Dannenbaum, supra note 5, at 1280. 
57. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of Aggression in International Law, Its Culmination in the 
Kampala Amendments, and Its Future Legal Characterization, 58 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW 
JOURNAL 87, 88 (2017). 
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that the crime of aggression seems unfit to address. Therefore, he concludes, 
the focus should be “on these new forms of violence and the more tradi-
tional, and well-established, crimes, for example, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.”58 
Similarly, Creegan also concludes that the crime of aggression should not 
have been included in the Rome Statute.59 She argues that aggression is a 
political crime “committed by the leadership of one state, directed against 
the abstract interests of another state, both states being political entities and 
actors.”60 Due to its nature, the crime of aggression can be committed even 
if no single human being is harmed. Unlike war crimes, crimes against hu-
manity, and genocide, the crime of aggression does not necessarily entail “se-
rious, pervasive human suffering.”61 Furthermore, an act of aggression could 
even be committed to prevent human suffering, such as in case of humani-
tarian interventions. Creegan thus concludes: 
 
Without adversely affected human victims, it is hard to put a crime like 
aggression in a category similar to war crimes or crimes against humanity 
or genocide. And it does not seem to belong next to them; it almost de-
means them. While aggression can lead to these most incredible forms of 
harm, it may be better to punish those acts instead.62  
 
While some scholars posit that the crime of aggression should not have 
been included in the Rome Statute, other scholars believe that criminalizing 
aggressive war is not unreasonable. Notably, some authors propound that 
the sovereignty-based understanding of aggression does not completely ig-
nore the people living within the State. Sovereignty and the corollary ban on 
the use of force protect the right to self-determination of people.63 By crim-
inalizing the unlawful use of force against another State, the crime of aggres-
sion de facto protects people’s right to “freely determine their political status 
                                                                                                                      
58. Id. at 89. 
59. Erin Creegan, Justified Uses of Force and the Crime of Aggression, 10 JOURNAL OF INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 59, 59–60 (2012). 
60. Id. at 62. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 63. 
63. Mégret, supra note 5, at 1404 (finding that “aggression is a form of subjugation and 
oppression of a population”); Christopher Kutz, Democracy, Defence, and the Threat of Interven-
tion, in THE MORALITY OF DEFENSIVE WAR 229, 262 (Cécile Fabre & Seth Lazar eds., 2014) 
(noting that “to protect a state from intervention . . . is to protect the condition of self-
formation of a people”). 
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and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”64 This is 
deemed valuable in itself, regardless of the form of government and respect 
of “standards of democracy.”65 For Walzer, one of the main supporters of 
this approach, “the state is still the critical arena of political life.”66 Accord-
ingly, acts that result in the disruption of the State amount to a loss of the 
individuals: 
 
[A] loss of something valuable, which they clearly value, and to which they 
have a right, namely their participation in the “development” that goes on 
and can only go on within the enclosure. Hence the distinction of state 
rights and individual rights is simplistic and wrongheaded. Against foreign-
ers, individuals have a right to a state of their own. Against state officials, 
they have a right to political and civil liberty. Without the first of these 
rights, the second is meaningless: as individuals need a home, so rights re-
quire a location.67  
 
Accordingly, some scholars affirm that the crime of aggression should 
not be abandoned. However, to have a meaningful impact it should be re-
framed in terms of human rights. For instance, Ferencz suggested that acts 
of aggression could be prosecuted as a crime against humanity.68 The Rome 
Statute offers a list of acts that amount to crime against humanity—such as 
murder, enslavement, and rape—and adds that “other inhumane acts of a 
similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to 
body or to mental or physical health” could amount to crimes against hu-
manity as well.69 Therefore, Ferencz propounded that: “any person respon-
sible for the illegal use of armed force in violation of the UN Charter, which 
unavoidably and inevitably results in the death of large numbers of civilians, should be 
subject to punishment for his individual criminal responsibility in the perpe-
tration of a crime against humanity.”70 Ferencz put forward the possibility to 
                                                                                                                      
64. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples (Dec. 14, 1960). 
65. Kutz, supra note 63, at 236. 
66. Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics, 9 PHILOSOPHY 
AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 209, 227 (1980). 
67. Id. at 228. 
68. Benjamin B. Ferencz, The Illegal Use of Armed Force as a Crime Against Humanity, 2 
JOURNAL ON THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 187 (2015). 
69. Rome Statute, supra note 37, art. 7(1)(k). 
70. Ferencz, supra note 68, at 195 (emphasis added); see also Manuel J. Ventura & Mat-
thew Gillett, The Fog of War: Prosecuting Illegal Uses of Force as Crimes against Humanity, 12 WASH-
INGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW 523 (2013); Manuel J. Ventura, The 
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include aggression within the category of crimes against humanity in 2015; 
but at the time, aggression was still an offense in waiting.71 Indeed, while the 
Kampala compromise had been adopted, it entered into force only in Sep-
tember 2016, following the thirtieth ratification of the Kampala Amend-
ments on the Crime of Aggression.72 
Ferencz was not the only scholar to attempt to humanize aggression, as 
a number of authors have questioned why aggression deserves to be included 
in the current legal framework. Several authors have suggested that aggres-
sion is wrong because of its consequences. By starting an illegal war, the 
aggressor causes death, destruction, and suffering, all things that could have 
been avoided if the State had not engaged in acts of aggression. For instance, 
Mégret acknowledges that considering aggression as a crime against sover-
eignty is “out of tune with contemporary humanitarian sensitivities”73 and 
makes the case that aggression should be conceptualized as primarily a crime 
against human rights: 
 
What is problematic is that the aggressing state is, thanks to its aggression, 
“gaining” the ability to kill combatants and civilians legally under the laws 
of war that it would have had no right to kill otherwise, and that it only gets 
to kill as a result of “unfairly” (from a broader moral or human rights stand-
point) benefiting from the regime of the laws of war.74 
 
Similarly, according to Dannenbaum an act of aggression does violate 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the victim State. However, this is 
not why aggression is wrong. Instead, it is the “widespread killing and the 
infliction of human suffering without justification” that constitutes the rea-
son why it should be criminalized.75 Indeed, Dannenbaum concludes: 
 
What is unique about illegal war among violations of states’ rights—what 
makes it criminal, when no other sovereignty violation is—is the fact that 
it entails the slaughter of human life, the infliction of human suffering, and 
the erosion of human security. . . . [I]t is the unjustified killing and infliction 
                                                                                                                      
Illegal Use of Force (Other Inhumane Act) as a Crime Against Humanity: An Assessment of the Case 
for a New Crime at the International Criminal Court, in SEEKING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE 
UNLAWFUL USE OF FORCE 386 (Leila Nadya Sadat ed., 2018). 
71. BANTEKAS, supra note 49, at 287. 
72. See Kampala Amendments, supra note 1. 
73. Mégret, supra note 5, at 1444–45. 
74. Id. at 1437. 
75. Dannenbaum, supra note 5, at 1263. 
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of human suffering, and not the violation of sovereignty, that are the 
wrongs at the heart of aggression.76 
 
III. THE HUMANIZATION OF PEACE 
 
A. The Invention of Peace 
 
Since its inception, the crime of aggression has been defined as a crime 
against peace. Nevertheless, a central conceptual challenge is that there is no 
generally accepted definition of peace in international law.77 While the defi-
nition of international and non-international armed conflicts has gripped 
scholarship and practice for decades,78 the notion of peace has received scant 
attention. A possible reason for this oversight is that, while “[w]ar can be 
seen as a distinct event, confined to a relatively narrow time frame and space, 
and involves primarily military interactions,”79 peace is a complex relation-
ship, whose content is highly unclear. As explained by McDougal: 
 
[t]he conception of peace, as contraposed to war, in the historic literature 
of international law is most imprecise. The words “peace” and “war” are 
characteristically employed, in high ambiguity, to make simultaneous refer-
ence both to the presence or absence of the facts of transnational violence 
and coercion and to the legal consequences to be attached by authoritative 
decision to different intensities in violence and coercion.80 
                                                                                                                      
76. Id. at 1270. 
77. Anna Spain Bradley, Deciding to Intervene, 51(847) HOUSTON LAW REVIEW 847, 898 
(2014). 
78. See, e.g., ANTHONY CULLEN, THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED 
CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2010); Lindsay Moir, The Concept of 
Non-International Armed Conflict, in THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 391 
(Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta & Marco Sassòli eds., 2015); SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE 
LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (2012). 
79. GARY GOERTZ, PAUL F. DIEHL & ALEXANDRU BALAS, THE PUZZLE OF PEACE: 
THE EVOLUTION OF PEACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 3 (2016); see also HOWARD, 
supra note 6, at 1–2. 
80. Myres Smith McDougal, Law and Peace, 18 DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND POLICY 1, 5 (1989); see also Richard Hart Sinnreich, Conclusion: History and the Mak-
ing of Peace, in THE MAKING OF PEACE: RULERS, STATES, AND THE AFTERMATH OF WAR 
356, 359 (Williamson Murray & Jim Lacey eds., 2009) 
[T]here is not even uniform agreement on how one might define peace: whether simply as 
the momentary absence of war, as the by-product of an international order satisfying some 
normative theological or ideological criterion, or as a sociologically unnatural condition, 
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In the middle of the nineteenth century, Sir Henry Maine noted that 
“[w]ar appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern invention.”81 
Now, it is generally accepted that “peace is the normal order of human af-
fairs.”82 However, this has not always been the case. In his History of the Pelo-
ponnesian War, Thucydides contends: 
 
It will be enough for me . . . if these words of mine are judged useful by 
those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the 
past and which (human nature being what it is) will at some time or other 
and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future.83 
 
It is fairly clear that Thucydides had no expectation in the possibility of a 
lasting peace, “human nature being what it is.”84 Indeed, he found that war 
is endemic, inevitable, and expected.85 Historical example seems to confirm 
this view, as war has been a constant presence in people’s lives for centuries, 
with few exceptions. 
As one such exception, from 30 BCE to 250 CE, the Roman Empire 
experienced a period of relative peace: the Pax Romana. Historian Edward 
Gibbon described with clarity this exceptional moment: 
 
In the second century of the Christian era, the empire of Rome compre-
hended the fairest part of the earth, and the most civilized portion of man-
kind. The frontiers of that extensive monarchy were guarded by ancient 
renown and disciplined valour. The gentle, but powerful, influence of laws 
and manners had gradually cemented the union of the provinces. Their 
peaceful inhabitants enjoyed and abused the advantage of wealth and lux-
ury.86 
 
                                                                                                                      
which thus requires deliberate creation and can survive only through constant and pains-
taking attention. 
81. HOWARD, supra note 6, at 1 (quoting Henry Maine). 
82. Williamson Murray, Introduction: Searching for Peace, in THE MAKING OF PEACE: RUL-
ERS, STATES, AND THE AFTERMATH OF WAR 3 (Williamson Murray & Jim Lacey eds., 2009). 
83. THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 48 (Rex Warner trans., Pen-
guin Books 1954) (431 BCE). 
84. Id.; see also Murray, supra note 82, at 2. 
85. MICHAEL HOWARD, WAR AND THE LIBERAL CONSCIENCE 5 (2008) (noting that 
“even those who saw [war] as evil normally considered it is a necessary evil”). 
86. 1 EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN 
EMPIRE 1 (J.B. Bury ed., Heritage Press 1946) (1776). 
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Albeit the fact that peace was substantially maintained through tyranny, it is 
remarkable to think that only 150,000 legionaries, divided into thirty legions, 
and supported by 150,000 auxiliaries were sufficient to protect an empire of 
approximately 60 million inhabitants.87 However, it has been observed, and 
rightly so, that this was an exceptional circumstance: an anomaly at a time 
where war was the norm.88 Indeed, with the collapse of the Pax Romana un-
der the pressure of the barbarian invasions, Europe became characterized by 
near-constant conflict.89 Nevertheless, efforts to achieve lasting peace con-
tinued. Perhaps most notably, the Peace of Westphalia (1648) ended the 
Thirty Years’ War and is considered the benchmark that marks the beginning 
of the modern international system. As Gross notes, it was “the first of sev-
eral attempts to establish something resembling world unity on the basis of 
states exercising untrammeled sovereignty over certain territories and subor-
dinated to no earthly authority.”90 It is also significant as it helped establish 
important practices for peace negotiations. Specifically, direct bilateral dia-
logue and facilitated mediation emerged as two crucial methods to conduct 
future peace negotiations.91 
As Sir Michael Howard has demonstrated in his seminal works, it was 
only in Victorian Britain that the idea of a lasting peace began to emerge.92 
In the nineteenth century, States started to include a prohibition on the use 
of force in nearly all bilateral treaties. Instead of resolving differences using 
force, the parties assumed the obligation to seek the peaceful settlement of 
                                                                                                                      
87. Murray, supra note 82, at 7. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 8. 
90. Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 3, 20 (Leo Gross ed., 1993). But see Stéphane Beaulac, 
The Westphalian Legal Orthodoxy – Myth or Reality?, 2 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 148 (2000); Derek Croxton, Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sov-
ereignty, 21 INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW 569 (1999); Brendan Simms, “A False Princi-
ple in the Law of Nations”: Burke, State Sovereignty, [German] Liberty, and Intervention in the Age of 
Westphalia, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A HISTORY 89 (Brendan Simms & D.J.B. 
Trim eds., 2011). 
91. Similarly, the Congress of Vienna (1814–15) was an attempt to establish peace after 
prolonged conflicts. In both cases, the negotiators were aware of “the perils and the damage 
that prolonged conflicts inflict on all.” Murray, supra note 82, at 15–16; see also Heinz Duch-
hardt, Peace Treaties from Westphalia to the Revolutionary Era, in PEACE TREATIES AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY: FROM THE LATE MIDDLE AGES TO WORLD WAR 
ONE 45, 52 (Randall Lesaffer ed., 2004). 
92. HOWARD, supra note 6; HOWARD, supra note 85; see also Murray, supra note 82 at 12. 
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disputes.93 However, the treaties presented limitations both ratione personae 
and ratione temporis, as they were applicable only between the contracting par-
ties and had a fixed time limit.94 It was only with the Hague Peace Confer-
ences (1899 and 1907) that “[t]he preservation of peace [had] been put for-
ward as the object of international policy.”95 As noted in the Russian pro-
posal to initiate the peace conference: “The maintenance of general peace 
and a possible reduction of the excessive armaments which weigh upon all 
nations present themselves, in the existing condition of the whole world, as 
the ideal towards which the endeavors of all Governments should be di-
rected.”96 
The creation of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact con-
stitute further attempts to promote peaceful settlement of disputes and limit 
war. Notably, the Covenant of the League of Nations provided that, in case 
a dispute arose between members of the League, the States concerned were 
bound to submit the case “either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Coun-
cil,”97 and, after the adoption of the decision, States had to wait three months 
before resorting to war.98 Going further, Article 1 of the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
states, “the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever 
nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall 
never be sought except by pacific means.”99 The Kellogg-Briand pact did not 
constitute a replacement of the League of Nations; rather, it attempted to fill 
the gaps of the League’s Covenant, most notably the absence of a more gen-
eral proscription to wage war. Regardless, the concomitant application of the 
two treaties did not have the force to prevent the outbreak of World War II. 
                                                                                                                      
93. J.L. BRIERLY, THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (1944). 
94. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Extradition, Hond.-Nicar., Mar. 13, 
1878, 152 Consol. T.S. 415; Washington Treaty for the Establishment of a Permanent Com-
mission of Enquiry, Guat.-U.S., Sept. 20, 1913, 218 Consol. T.S. 373; Treaty of Mutual 
Guarantee, Oct. 16, 1925, 54 L.N.T.S. 289 (referred to as the Locarno Treaty, the parties 
were Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy); Teheran Treaty of Friendship and 
Security, Persia-Turk., Apr. 12, 1926, 106 L.N.T.S. 2613; see also DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 
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95. THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, at xiv–xvi (James Brown Scott ed., 
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96. Id. 
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It is remarkable that, in spite of the two World Wars, the idea of a lasting 
peace persisted and culminated in the creation of the United Nations.100 In-
deed, with the carnage it wrought, World War II could be considered “the 
tipping point in the international system’s movement toward more peace.”101 
The adoption of the U.N. Charter should be read against this backdrop. In 
light of the devastating consequences of the two World Wars, the delegates 
at the San Francisco conference “were convinced that force was simply too 
destructive to be considered an acceptable means of pursuing changes or 
advancing other policy.”102 The United Nations was considered an instru-
ment to promote and maintain peace among nations. Notably, Article 1(1) 
of the U.N. Charter specifies that the objective of the organization is: 
 
[t]o maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take ef-
fective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the 
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of 
the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with 
the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace. 103 
 
Interestingly, the U.N. Charter does not establish an obligation upon 
States to promote peace per se.104 Instead, it prescribes a series of obligations 
aimed at avoiding the use of force among States. Fox example, Article 2(3) 
specifies that “[a]ll Members shall settle their international disputes by peace-
ful means” in such a manner that peace, security, and justice are not endan-
gered.105 Further, Article 2(4) famously prohibits the use of force “against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”106 Finally, 
the Security Council is identified as the primary organ tasked with the 
                                                                                                                      
100. Philip Alston, Peace as Human Right, 11 BULLETIN OF PEACE PROPOSALS 319 
(1980) (“noting that the period following the Second World War . . . was a period which 
witnessed the establishment of the United Nations as a world organization committed to 
the securing and maintenance of world peace, the advancement of economic and social 
development, and the promotion of respect for human rights”). 
101. GOERTZ, DIEHL & BALAS, supra note 79, at 8. 
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maintenance or restoration of peace and security.107 The landmark role of 
the Charter in the maintenance of peace was confirmed by the UNGA on 
several occasions. For instance, in its Resolution Essentials of Peace the UNGA 
affirmed that: 
 
[T]he Charter of the United Nations, the most solemn pact of peace in 
history, lays down basic principles necessary for an enduring peace; that 
disregard of these principles is primarily responsible for the continuance of 
international tension; and that it is urgently necessary for all Members to 
act in accordance with these principles in the spirit of co-operation on 
which the United Nations was founded.108 
 
Since then, the promotion of peace has been considered the central purpose 
and raison d’être not only of the U.N. system, but also of international law.109 
Nevertheless, the meaning of peace remains unclear. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
107. Id. art. 24, para 1. (“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United 
Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”); art. 39 (“The Security Council 
shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of ag-
gression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in ac-
cordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”); 
art. 26 
In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security 
with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the 
Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military 
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Further, Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter allows the Security Council to call upon the parties 
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and coercive measures. See U.N. Charter art. 39. 
108. G.A. Res. 290 (IV), Essentials of Peace (Dec. 1, 1949). 
109. Alston, supra note 100, at 325 (“The quest for peace is more than simply a proper 
juridical concern of international law. It is, in the last resort, its raison d’etre.”); Bradley, supra 
note 77, at 891 (finding that “international law’s central purpose, the reason for which it was 
created and exists, is and always has been the promotion of peace”); Katarina Tomasevski, 
The Right to Peace, 5 CURRENT RESEARCH ON PEACE AND VIOLENCE 42, 44 (1982) (“Peace 
is a supreme value of mankind and if not the supreme value cherished by international law, 
then certainly one of its supreme values.”). 
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B. Reframing Peace in Terms of Human Rights 
 
Since Grotius, and especially the publication of De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the 
Law of War and Peace), international law has been based on a “binary dis-
tinction,”110 where war and peace constitute the pivotal dichotomy in the 
international legal framework.111 This distinction can be traced back to the 
intellectual tradition that emerged in the sixteenth century, which considered 
peace “merely to the absence of armed conflict among organized and sover-
eign groups.”112 Similarly, Hobbes defined peace in negative terms: 
 
WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract 
of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and 
therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; 
as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth 
not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes 
together; So the nature of Warre, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in 
the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to 
the contrary. All other time is PEACE.113 
 
Although the U.N. Charter does not provide a definition of peace, it has 
been suggested that it implicitly endorses an understanding of peace in the 
negative sense. Inasmuch as the pivotal purpose of the U.N. system is “to 
maintain international peace and security” through the prevention and sup-
pression of the use of force—as expressly established by Article 1 of the 
U.N. Charter—it seems fair to deduce that the pivotal objective of the Char-
ter is to avoid war.114 
In its traditional understanding, the prohibition on the crime of aggres-
sion is directed at protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. 
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and & Siegfried Wiessner, Law and Peace in a Changing World, 22 CUMBERLAND LAW REVIEW 
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As outlawing aggression was ultimately aimed at avoiding war, it was sub-
stantially a crime against negative peace. During the two World Wars, millions 
of people were killed and wounded, most of them civilians. The international 
community was thus aware of the “shattering potential of aggression”115 and 
concerned foremost with avoiding the outbreak of another devastating con-
flict.116 Sovereignty, the prohibition on the use of force, and the criminaliza-
tion of aggression were all pieces of the same puzzle, to which the ultimate 
aim was peace in its negative conception. 
The U.N. Charter reflects this approach. Article 1 famously establishes 
that the paramount purpose of the United Nations is: 
 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take ef-
fective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the 
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of 
the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with 
the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace.117 
 
Thus, the U.N. system entails “a state of affairs in which attempts to change 
the status quo by violence are unlawful and doomed to frustration through 
opposition in overwhelming force.”118 As such, the Charter establishes the 
supremacy of peace over justice.119 Kelsen recognized the secondary role of 
justice and highlighted that the U.N. Charter does not provide guidance in 
case of conflict between justice and other values protected therein.120 Specif-
ically, he maintains that, according to Article 1, respecting the principle of 
                                                                                                                      
115. Mégret, supra note 5, at 1414. 
116. Thomas M. Franck, The United Nations as Guarantor of International Peace and Security, 
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justice is required only for the settlement of disputes.121 Accordingly, in the 
U.N. system the prevention of war is paramount. 
Nevertheless, with the humanization of international law uneasiness 
emerged toward the mere absence of war as a valuable end per se. Over the 
past decades, States have been increasingly accountable with regard to hu-
man rights vis-à-vis the people under their jurisdiction: “International Or-
ganizations, civil society activists and NGOs use the international human 
rights norms and instruments as the concrete point of reference against 
which to judge state conduct.”122 As such, sovereignty seems limited by hu-
man rights, as the emergence of the latter would inevitably lead to an erosion 
of the former.123 According to several scholars this paradigm shift should be 
welcomed. For example, Koskenniemi finds the “withering away [of sover-
eignty]” a positive development,124 while Henkin states, “the ‘S word’ was a 
mistake built upon mistakes, which has barnacled an unfortunate mythol-
ogy.”125 Other scholars are less enthusiastic about this development, noting 
that sovereignty can serve as “defence of the weak facing off with the 
strong. . . . Thus, the removal of the sovereignty barrier at this historical 
moment necessarily has ambiguous consequences.”126 
Following this debate, the R2P doctrine sought to recharacterize sover-
eignty “from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility”127 and 
shift the focus from the rights of States to the protection of the people under 
                                                                                                                      
121. Hans Kelsen, Security and Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of the United Nations, 
42 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 783, 788–89 (1948). 
122. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, 
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their jurisdiction.128 R2P is emblematic of the conundrum between negative 
peace and justice. While the U.N. Charter is clear in determining the primacy 
of peace over justice, the humanization of international law has highlighted 
that the maintenance of the status quo is not always desirable.  
Soon after the adoption of the U.N. Charter, the emergence of human 
rights and the process of decolonization determined the necessity of rede-
fining peace.129 Peace quickly came to be understood as meaning more than 
the mere absence of war. Indeed, the negative understanding of peace fails 
to recognize the complexities of this concept. While war is an event, peace 
is foremost a relationship. As Goertz explains: 
 
Peace involves many different kinds of interactions; many are diffuse, in-
volve different actors, and are less subject to easy observation than are mil-
itary encounters. . . . Because peace is a relationship as well, we leverage the 
concept of rivalry to think about peace in terms of positive, cooperative 
relationships between states.130 
 
Therefore, a number of authors have propounded the idea of positive peace, 
consisting not only as the absence of war, but also the promotion and devel-
opment of equality and social justice.131 If interpreted as mere absence of 
war, peace would “not preclude the presence of various forms of indirect or 
                                                                                                                      
128. R2P was endorsed by the General Assembly in the World Summit Outcome doc-
ument, which established the primary responsibility of each individual state “to protect its 
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a parallel, subsidiary responsibility of the international community to use “appropriate dip-
lomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means” to help protect populations from such 
heinous crimes. Id. ¶ 139. Should these measures be deemed insufficient, the World Summit 
Outcome document envisages the possibility of a collective military action with the author-
ization of the Security Council. Id.; see also LUKE GLANVILLE, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RE-
SPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: A NEW HISTORY 197 (2014); Claus Kreß, Major Post-Westphalian 
Shifts and Some Important Neo-Westphalian Hesitations in the State Practice on the International Law 
on The Use of Force, 1 JOURNAL ON THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 11, 19 
(2014); Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 99, 102 (2007). 
129. Tomasevski, supra note 109, at 45. 
130. GOERTZ, DIEHL & BALAS, supra note 79, at 3-4. 
131. See, e.g., Ved P. Nanda, Nuclear Weapons and the Right to Peace under International Law, 
9 BROOKLYN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 283, 287 (1983); Bradley, supra note 77, 
at 901. 
 
 
 
The Human Dimension of Peace and Aggression Vol. 96 
629 
 
 
 
 
 
structural violence within society.”132 Instead, positive peace aims at creating 
conditions of equality and social justice, hence addressing the root causes of 
the recourse to violence.133 The idea that peace and human rights are strictly 
intertwined is expressly stated in an early draft of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, which establishes that: “there can be no peace unless hu-
man rights and freedoms are respected . . . there can be no human dignity 
unless war and the threat of war is abolished.”134 In other words, peace is 
interpreted as encompassing the respect of human rights and as a crucial 
premise for their enjoyment. As noted by Eide, “it does not take much re-
flection to recognize that violence and war negatively affect the enjoyment 
of human rights.”135 
Against this backdrop, the right to peace emerged. In 1981, the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights proclaimed, “[a]ll peoples shall have 
the right to national and international peace and security.”136 A few years 
later, the UNGA adopted the same position. In its Declaration on the Right of 
Peoples to Peace, it affirmed that “the peoples of our planet have a sacred right 
to peace” and that “the preservation of the right of peoples to peace and the 
promotion of its implementation constitute a fundamental obligation of each 
State.”137 Therefore, peace is not only “the purpose of all purposes,”138 but it 
                                                                                                                      
132. Patrick Hayden, Constraining War: Human Security and the Human Right to Peace, 6 
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is also a human right pertaining to each individual.139 Since then, the right to 
peace has been reaffirmed both at the international and regional level. 
Building on this understanding, in 2002 the U.N. Commission on Hu-
man Rights proclaimed “that the peoples of our planet have a sacred right 
to peace” and that “the preservation of the right of peoples to peace and the 
promotion of its implementation constitute a fundamental obligation of each 
state.”140 The following year, the UNGA echoed this position in its resolu-
tion, the Promotion of the Right of Peoples to Peace.141 Soon thereafter, the Com-
mission on Human Rights adopted a similar resolution, the Promotion of Peace 
as a Vital Requirement for the Full Enjoyment of all Human Rights by All,142 which 
was in turn followed by a UNGA resolution reaffirming the right to peace.143 
Likewise, the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities adopted resolutions where it concluded, “Interna-
tional peace and security is an essential condition for the enjoyment of hu-
man rights, above all the right to life.”144 Further, the General Conference of 
UNESCO adopted the Declaration of Principles of Tolerance, which recognized 
that human beings have “the right to live in peace and to be as they are.”145 
The right to peace is traditionally mentioned among the third generation 
of human rights, or solidarity rights.146 And while this right has been pro-
claimed and reaffirmed in several official documents adopted both at the 
international and regional level, these sources do not seem sufficient to claim 
the existence of a right to peace per se, although they provide a solid basis 
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to claim the emergence of this right. Nevertheless, this development is valu-
able inasmuch as “it links the very structural condition that aggression is said 
to disrupt with a notion of individual and collective rights.”147 
 
C. The Peace versus Justice Conundrum 
 
“No peace without justice” is a slogan that has been widely used in recent 
times.148 The idea that justice and peace are intertwined and that there cannot 
be one without the other has now become commonplace. Accordingly, the 
notion of negative peace has been criticized as it is not necessarily just. If 
peace means absence of war, it is clear that it does not provide any guarantees 
as to whether there is justice. As Schabas correctly notes, “There are many 
examples of lasting peace where there is no accountability for atrocities, just 
as there are examples of conflicts that recur even when some justice has been 
delivered.”149Against this background, positive peace has emerged as an at-
tempt to reconcile peace with justice, whereby peace “implies a social and 
political ordering of society that is generally accepted as just.”150 
What does ICL have to say on the relationship between peace and jus-
tice? The Preamble of the Rome Statute acknowledges that the two concepts 
are closely connected. First, it “[r]ecogniz[es] that such grave crimes threaten 
the peace, security and well-being of the world.”151 Furthermore, it: 
 
Reaffirm[s] the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter of the United 
Nations, and in particular that all States shall refrain from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.152  
 
Clearly, the most unambiguous confirmation that peace is relevant for 
the ICC is the introduction of the crime of aggression. It is thus unsurprising 
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that the Preamble of the Kampala Declaration posits, “[t]here can be no last-
ing peace without justice . . . peace and justice are thus complementary re-
quirements,” while also emphasizing that “justice is a fundamental building 
block of sustainable peace.”153 Furthermore, a panel discussion during the 
Kampala Conference acknowledged, “there is now a positive relationship 
between peace and justice although tensions between the two remained that 
needed to be acknowledged and addressed.”154 
Notwithstanding the numerous references to the relationship between 
peace and justice in ICL, and particularly within the ICC, challenges remain. 
The debate on the meaning of interest of justice is one well-known example 
of this conundrum. According to Article 53(1)(c) of the Rome Statute, the 
Prosecutor can decline to investigate or prosecute when “there are nonethe-
less substantial reasons to believe that [the investigation or prosecution] 
would not serve the interests of justice.”155 However, the Rome Statute does 
not define “interest of justice,” nor does it provide guidance regarding its 
interpretation. 
In 2007, Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo issued a policy paper where 
it offered his interpretation.156 There, he recognized that interest of justice 
“represents one of the most complex aspects of the Treaty.”157 Indeed, “[i]t 
is the point where many of the philosophical and operational challenges in 
the pursuit of international criminal justice coincide (albeit implicitly).”158 
Furthermore, he propounded that “there is a difference between the con-
cepts of the interests of justice and the interests of peace and that the latter 
falls within the mandate of institutions other than the Office of the Prose-
cutor.”159 He then reiterated this point, affirming that “the broader matter of 
international peace and security is not the responsibility of the Prosecutor; it 
falls within the mandate of other institutions.”160 
Of course, this position is not the only possible interpretation of the re-
lationship between peace and justice. And the drafting history of the Rome 
Statute suggests the opposite position, whereby several references to the 
maintenance of peace can be found in the Rome Statute. Moreover, it is 
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worth recalling that the UNSC created the ad hoc tribunals under its man-
date to promote peace and security and invoked Chapter VII of the U.N. 
Charter in support.161 This interpretation is further confirmed by the first 
annual report of the ICTY, which stated: 
 
It would be wrong to assume that the Tribunal is based on the old maxim 
fiat justitia et pereat mundus (let justice be done, even if the world were to 
perish). The Tribunal is, rather, based on the maxim propounded by Hegel 
in 1821: fiat justitia ne pereat mundus (let justice be done lest the world should 
perish). Indeed, the judicial process aims at averting the exacerbation and 
aggravation of conflict and tension, thereby contributing, albeit gradually, 
to a lasting peace.162  
 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE HUMANIZATION OF PEACE AND        
AGGRESSION 
 
A. Is Aggression Still the “Supreme International Crime”? 
 
On June 6, 1945, Justice Jackson put forward the idea that aggression should 
be a crime and insisted on its inclusion in the Nuremberg Tribunal.163 His 
proposal was accepted, albeit with some hesitation, and the crime of aggres-
sion was approved at the London Conference.164 As famously known, the 
Tribunal later held that the initiating a war of aggression was “the supreme 
international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains 
within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”165 Nevertheless, the out-
come of the Tribunal suggests certain unease with regard to convictions for 
the crime of aggression. While some of the defendants found guilty for in-
ternational crimes other than aggression were sentenced to death, nobody 
convicted only for crimes against peace was sentenced to capital punish-
ment.166 For instance, Rudolph Hess, who was convicted for the crime of 
aggression and acquitted for crimes against humanity and war crimes, was 
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condemned to life imprisonment. Conversely, Juluis Streicher, who was con-
victed of crimes against humanity and acquitted for crimes against peace, was 
condemned to death.167  
This disconnect between the idea that aggressive war was the supreme 
international crime and the hesitation in imposing the “supreme penalty”168 
to those found guilty of the crime might be explained by the different views 
of the judges sitting at Nuremberg. While Jackson enthusiastically supported 
the idea that aggression is the supreme international crime, his European 
colleagues were more hesitant, as acknowledged by Jackson himself during 
the London Conference: 
 
It is probably very difficult for those of you who have lived under the im-
mediate attack of the Nazis to appreciate the different public psychology 
that those of us who were in the American Government dealt with. Our 
American population is at least 3,000 miles from the scene. Germany did 
not attack or invade the United States in violation of any treaty with us. 
The thing that led us to take sides in this war was that we regarded Ger-
many’s resort to war as illegal from its outset, as an illegitimate attack on 
the international peace and order.169  
 
During the Nuremberg conference, there were already debates as to why 
the crime of aggression should have been prosecuted and its position to 
other international crimes. Unlike the European population, the United 
States was thousands of miles removed from World War II battlefields and 
did not directly experience the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime. This 
resulted in two concurring views. First, the crime of aggression was defined 
as the “supreme international crime,” and second, this crime was considered 
morally wrong and evil also because of its consequences. This dichotomy is 
not only reflected in the different convictions for the crime of aggression 
and the other two international crimes—crimes against humanity and war 
crimes—but it is further confirmed by the reference to the crime of aggres-
sion in the Nuremberg judgments. For instance, the U.S.-administered Nu-
remberg Military Tribunals defined aggression as “the “pinnacle of criminal-
ity” due to its infliction of “horror, suffering, and loss.”170 Similarly, in the 
judgment of the Tokyo trials it was affirmed that aggression is the gravest 
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crime because of the “death and suffering . . . inflicted on countless human 
beings.”171 Furthermore, it was specified that:  
 
If, in any case, the finding be that the war was not unlawful then the charge 
of murder will fall with the charge of waging unlawful war. If, on the other 
hand, the war, in any particular case, is held to have been unlawful, then 
this involves unlawful killings . . . at all places in the theater of war and at 
all times throughout the period of the war.172  
 
Accordingly, while the crime of aggression first entered the international 
legal framework as the “supreme crime,” Nuremberg came to be primarily 
remembered “as a trial of atrocities rather than of aggression.”173 At the Nu-
remberg and Tokyo trials, crimes against humanity were defined as “murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts commit-
ted against any civilian population, before or during the war . . . .”174 The nexus 
between aggression and crimes against humanity was thus explicit in the Tri-
bunals’ Charters.175 However, after Nuremberg this relationship has been 
abandoned. The tragedies that affected Cambodia and Rwanda clearly 
showed that aggression is not necessary to commit genocide and crimes 
against humanity. Accordingly, ad hoc international criminal tribunals dis-
carded the link between aggression and other crimes.176 We can thus con-
clude that the legacy of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials has more to do with 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, than with the crime of 
aggression. 
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moral core of the Allies’ case against the Nazi leaders.”). 
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The humanization of ICL and the legal limbo where the crime of aggres-
sion was secluded for decades confirms this point. As discussed above, sev-
eral scholars have suggested that the crime of aggression is morally wrong 
because of its heinous consequences, not because it entails a violation of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. As noted by Quincy Wright:  
 
Though aggressive war may result in larger losses of life, property and so-
cial values than any other crime, yet the relationship of the acts constituting 
the crime to such losses is less close than in the case of crime against hu-
manity. The latter implies acts indicating a direct responsibility for large-
scale homicide, enslavement or deportation of innocent civilians. The ini-
tiation of aggressive war, on the other hand, implies only declarations or 
other acts of political or group leadership.177  
 
Indeed, he adds that, while some of the acts of aggression prosecuted before 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals “resulted in [the] loss of millions of 
lives . . . others, such as the invasion of Austria and Czechoslovakia, resulted 
immediately in little loss of life.”178 Further, inasmuch as “aggression is [a] 
relatively ‘cold” crime,”179 the prohibition of which is directed at protecting 
State sovereignty and territorial integrity, it seems destined to play a second-
ary role in a humanized ICL.180 
This rationale underpins discussions on humanitarian intervention and 
the crime of aggression. Humanitarian intervention is the use of force by one 
or more States to prevent or stop the commission of grave violations of hu-
man rights and humanitarian law.181 When conducted without the authoriza-
tion of the U.N. Security Council, such interventions constitute an unlawful 
use of force and can amount to aggression. During the Kampala Conference 
some delegates pushed to exclude humanitarian intervention from the scope 
of application of Article 8bis of the Rome Statute, but these efforts failed 
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efforts, and no exception was included in the provision.182 Nevertheless, sev-
eral scholars have since tried to demonstrate that humanitarian intervention 
would be excluded from the crime of aggression. 
This position is not unreasonable. Article 8bis of the Rome Statute de-
fines the crime of aggression as: 
 
[T]he planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a posi-
tion effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and 
scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Na-
tions.183 
 
Therefore, it could be argued that humanitarian intervention would be ex-
cluded from the crime of aggression because, by their “character, gravity, 
and scale,” they would not constitute “a manifest violation of the Charter of 
the United Nations.”184 
In light of the foregoing, it seems that the crime of aggression is no 
longer “the supreme international crime.” On the one hand, it has lived in a 
legal limbo for decades, while genocide, war crimes, and crimes against hu-
manity were included in the ad hoc criminal tribunals. On the other hand, it 
has been suggested that humanitarian intervention would not qualify as a 
crime of aggression because it is directed at preventing or halting the com-
mission of other international crimes. We can thus concur with Mégret that: 
“The inter-state lens with which international crime was initially appre-
hended and that made aggression such a likely candidate for indignation has 
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thus gradually been replaced by a more cosmopolitan lens that makes geno-
cide and crimes against humanity – crimes that are typically committed do-
mestically – the ultimate scandal of our times.”185 
 
B. Peace, Justice, and the Question of Humanitarian Intervention 
 
The tension between the need to limit resort to armed force and to respond 
to the urgent requirements of justice finds one of its maximum expressions 
in the crime of aggression. At its inception, crimes against peace were inter-
preted as limiting the use of force, ultimately protecting sovereignty and the 
status quo. With the humanization of international law, the decolonization 
process, and shocking tragedies such as the genocides in Cambodia, Rwanda, 
and Kosovo, the focus of the international community and scholars alike 
shifted to other crimes, thus confining “the supreme international crime” to 
a legal limbo. As the crime of aggression reemerged, it had to fit in a pro-
foundly changed world. In the past decades, the tension between negative 
peace and considerations of justice and human rights has reshaped the legal 
debate on the jus ad bellum. Accordingly, the challenge emerged to reconcile 
the crime of aggression, anchored to an outdated view of the world, to recent 
developments concerning the legality of the use of force. 
This tension is most visible in the debates on humanitarian intervention. 
During the Kampala Conference, the United States proposed to exclude in-
terventions aimed at preventing or halting heinous violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law from the scope of application of the crime of 
aggression, even when such interventions take place without the authoriza-
tion of the Security Council.186 
 The starting point of the discussion is that “not every act of aggression 
is a crime of aggression.”187 Article 8bis of the Rome Statute provides a 
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“threshold clause,”188 where an unlawful use of force can amount to a crime 
of aggression if it constitutes a manifest violation of the UN Charter, in light 
of its “character, gravity, and scale.”189 While gravity and scale refer mainly 
to “the size of the violation,”190 the world “character” is considered to have 
a qualitative connotation. Specifically, its aim would be to exclude grey areas 
from the scope of Article 8bis, namely instances of use of force whose ille-
gality is not “reasonably uncontroversial.”191 This interpretation seems to 
find confirmation in the travaux préparatoires of the Kampala Amendments, 
where a number of delegates expressed the idea that “no borderline cases 
would fall under the Court’s jurisdiction due to the threshold require-
ment.”192 Therefore, it has been concluded that genuine humanitarian inter-
ventions would be excluded from the scope of the crime of aggression.193 
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Several scholars have criticized this position. Indeed, it is unclear when a 
humanitarian intervention would qualify as genuine. Furthermore, it has been 
highlighted that this interpretation could “strengthen the perception that 
such interventions are not ‘unambiguously unlawful’ and give further impe-
tus to the [humanitarian intervention] doctrine.”194 While we shall not at-
tempt to resolve this question here, the suggestion that bona fide humanitarian 
interventions are excluded from the scope of application of the crime of 
aggression underscores the extent to which the humanization of interna-
tional law has reshaped the crime of aggression. 
Particularly relevant on this point is the approach adopted by a number 
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) at the Kampala Conference. 
While several human rights NGOs have been “enthusiastic supporters of the 
criminal justice project,”195 they have not demonstrated the same interest to-
ward the crime of aggression. Amnesty International explained that it did 
not intend to engage with discussions on the crime of aggression “because 
its mandate – to campaign for every person to enjoy all of the human rights 
(civil and political and economic, social and cultural rights) enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human 
rights standards – does not extend to the lawfulness of the use of force.”196 
Similarly, Human Rights Watch stated: 
 
[Its] institutional mandate includes a position of strict neutrality on issues 
of jus ad bellum, because we find it the best way to focus on the conduct 
of war, or jus in bello, and thereby to promote our primary goal of encour-
aging all parties to a conflict to respect international humanitarian law. 
Consistent with this approach, we take no position on the substance of a 
definition of the crime of aggression.197 
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In a footnote, it then added that: “The only exceptions that Human Rights 
Watch has made to this policy is to call for military intervention where mas-
sive loss of human life, on the order of genocide, can be halted through no 
other means, as was the case in Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s.”198 
The hostility, or at least indifference, of human rights NGOs toward the 
crime of aggression fits well within the framework described so far. As gross 
and systematic violations of human rights and humanitarian law have raised 
the issue of military interventions aimed at stopping such heinous crimes, 
human rights have entered into discourses on the use of force. As Schabas 
notes, “[a] militaristic tendency has infiltrated the human rights movement 
in recent years, encouraged by talk of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and the 
‘responsibility to protect.’”199 
 
V. CONCLUSION: GOING BACK TO MOVE FORWARD? 
 
The analysis conducted so far has highlighted a stark divide between the 
sovereignty-based approach and the human rights-focused understanding of 
international law. According to the traditional sovereignty-based account, 
negative peace is the ultimate aim of the U.N. system and arguably of the 
international community. At the same time, aggression is fundamentally a 
crime whose prohibition is directed at protecting sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. Therefore, the ultimate aim would be the avoidance of war and the 
maintenance of the status quo, while disregarding or at least minimizing con-
siderations of human rights and justice. Interpreted as a crime against nega-
tive peace, aggression is destined to be seen with suspicion and will inevitably 
clash with a humanized international law. Similarly, the mere absence of war 
seems to have lost value, while a number of scholars and members of the 
international community have used the protection of human rights as a jus-
tification to wage war. Debates on humanitarian interventions and interven-
tions in the name of an emerging right to democratic governance are just 
two examples of the ways that human rights have permeated the jus ad bellum. 
In light of the foregoing, a human rights-focused understanding of in-
ternational has emerged. On the one hand, aggression does not seem to be 
the supreme international crime anymore, as the focus has shifted to geno-
cide, crime against humanity, and war crimes, that is, crimes directed at the 
protection of individuals. On the other hand, the promotion of justice and 
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human rights has gained a paramount position in the current legal frame-
work, as confirmed by the notion of positive peace. The humanization of 
international law has thus reshaped the relationship between peace, aggres-
sion, and justice. 
This situation underscores a challenging, and perhaps unresolvable, ten-
sion within international law. While international human rights law is not per 
se opposed to peace, it has “increasingly been instrumentalized to justify 
war.”200 At the same time, the humanization of the jus ad bellum, IHL, and 
ICL has the paradoxical effect of pushing peace to the periphery.201 Admit-
tedly, human rights law has never expressed an unconditioned condemna-
tion of war. Further, the question of the legality of interventions to protect 
foreign populations from a tyrant did not emerge ex abrupto during the twen-
tieth century, as it was already present in the Middle Ages. Indeed, scholars 
and jurists as influential as Hugo Grotius, Francisco de Victoria, and Fran-
cisco Suarez argued for what we could call a humanitarian intervention ante 
litteram. Nevertheless, the current situation is paradoxical: arguably, the rea-
son why peace is the most important value of the international community 
is that it is the crucial premise necessary to enjoy human rights. 
Consequently, it seems that negative peace is no longer the primary aim 
of the international community. Values are thus judged though the lenses of 
the humanized international legal framework. When these values appear in 
contrast with the latter, they are subjected to attempts to reconcile them with 
human rights. Therefore, the crime of aggression would deserve to be in-
cluded in the Rome Statute inasmuch as it “involves unjustified, direct at-
tacks on the lives and physical integrity of human beings.”202 Similarly, a neg-
ative conceptualization of peace does not seem adequate to the current con-
ditions: peace has to promote justice and equality. Accordingly, the ultimate 
objective of the jus ad bellum in particular—and of international law in gen-
eral—would be the protection and respect of human rights. 
This shift of paradigm largely determines how we view the crime of ag-
gression. Indeed, it seems that aggression no longer is considered a crime 
against negative peace and that it has been reframed as crime against positive 
peace, albeit implicitly. The claims that the real evil of aggression—and thus 
why it should be criminalized—is the consequent loss of human life, the 
attempts to exclude humanitarian intervention from the scope of application 
of Article 8bis of the Rome Statute, and the uneasiness toward the idea that 
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the criminalization of aggression protects State sovereignty, are all endeavors 
to reframe the crime of aggression in terms of human rights. So understood, 
the dichotomy between peace and aggression on the one hand, and justice 
and human rights on the other hand, would be reconciled. 
At first sight, the humanization of peace and aggression seems a positive 
development. However, a closer look reveals the dangers of this approach. 
Indeed, this approach entails significant risks related to the human rights-
based understanding of peace and aggression. First, it is at least debatable 
whether the positive acceptance of peace serves the cause of human rights 
and helps making peace more just. While it is true that the mere absence of 
war does not guarantee the respect of human rights, and hence is not con-
cerned by considerations of justice, negative peace could be a value per se. 
On the one hand, the idea of positive peace seems too broad and vague to 
serve as a feasible objective. On the other hand, it seems clear that the ab-
sence of war is a crucial premise to enjoy human rights. Even in case of gross 
and systematic violations of human rights and humanitarian law, it is ques-
tionable whether a military intervention would prove capable of preventing 
or halting the commission of atrocities. 
Second, we may wonder whether there is a need to reframe aggression 
in terms of human rights. Even if interpreted as a crime to protect sover-
eignty, the crime of aggression deserves to be included in positive interna-
tional law. While a common view sees sovereignty as a shield used by States 
to disregard human rights within their borders, a number of scholars has 
highlighted that sovereignty can serve as a shield to protect the human rights 
of the population against external forcible interventions.203 As Koskenniemi 
notes, “sovereignty was originally taken as a progressive, egalitarian principle 
and . . . it still carries these connotations.”204 Nor does viewing sovereignty 
with a necessarily negative connotation that inevitably conflicts with human 
rights reflect reality. The truth is more nuanced, and as May notes, “aggres-
sion is morally wrong because it destabilizes States that generally protect hu-
man rights more than they curtail them.”205 
Lastly, there is a certain degree of relativity inherent in any discussion on 
what is just. As long as there is no general agreement within the international 
community as to what extent human rights have replaced negative peace as 
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the ultimate aim of the international legal framework, this relativity appears 
inevitable. Moreover, the situation is complicated by the essentially political 
nature of the use of force in international relations. The risk that States would 
use justice and human rights in an instrumentalized fashion either disingen-
uously or at least without careful consideration as to the values that deserve 
to be protected is significant. Ultimately, we may wonder whether human 
rights law would better serve its cause if reconciled with a pacifist sensibility 
of international law that appreciates the absence of war as a value per se. 
 
